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TRAFFIX DEVICES, INC. V. MARKETING
DESPLAYS, INC.: THE PROBLEM WITH




There is a great deal of controversy over the conflict between fed-
eral trade dress protection, as codified in § 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademark Act,' and federal patent protection. There is great dispar-
ity among circuits in decisions involving the potential trade dress pro-
tection of something included in an expired patent. Because even the
Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in its interpretation of
the conflict between the two areas of law, many commentators believe
a bright-line rule needs to be promulgated.
Recently, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clear up the
confusion among the circuits that have addressed the issue of trade
dress protection for expired utility patents in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Marketing Displays, Inc.2 Lawyers, inventors, and corporations all
hoped that the Court would take the opportunity presented in this
case to create a bright-line rule or a more exact test differentiating
what could be protected as trade dress and what could be patented.
However, as will be explained below, a unanimous Court was able to
decide the case on the facts, without addressing what most thought
was the core issue, and declined to extend its decision in order to re-
solve the controversy.
What follows in this paper is a discussion of the law as it stands
now and how it evolved to its current state. Part I will first explain
generally the history of patent law and the policies behind it. Then, it
will explain federal trademark protection and the policies behind that.
t Wake Forest University School of Law, Class of 2002. The author would like to thank
Steve Gardner, Esq., of Kilpatrick Stockton for his advice and input on this article. Thanks
also to the author's mother and husband for their moral support. Finally, thanks to Brooke
Garrett, who offered much-needed support and encouragement during the writing and re-
vision processes.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
2 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
TRADE DRESS AND EXPIRED PATENTS
Next, it will show the origin and evolution of federal trade dress pro-
tection. Finally, Part I will briefly address the constitutional and prac-
tical issues raised by the conflict between patent and trade dress
protection. Part II will discuss relevant case law addressing the con-
flict. It will begin with a discussion of the TrafFix case, highlighting the
Court of Appeals decision in the case as a demonstration of the con-
flict among the circuits on the issue, followed by the Supreme Court's
resolution of the case. Part II will continue by tracing the conflict
through some pre-Lanham Act cases and some post-Lanham Act
cases. The pre-Lanham Act cases will show how the Court attempted
to resolve the issue before trademark law was federalized. The post-
Lanham Act cases will show how federalizing trademark and trade
dress law may have merely further confused the issues involved. Fi-
nally, in Part III, this paper will explain the tests used by the courts to





Federal patent law is authorized by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
of the United States Constitution, known variously as the Intellectual
Property Clause, the Patent Clause, or the Copyright Clause. In this
clause, the Constitution gives Congress the power to grant to "Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."'3 For an invention to be patentable, it must be new,
useful, and nonobvious. 4 The first hurdle an inventor must overcome
is in demonstrating her invention's utility. If the invention is useful,
then it must be proven novel, or a completely new invention (or a new
improvement of a previous invention). 5 Finally, the invention must
not be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art that the patent
involves. 6
Once it is apparent that these statutory hurdles can be overcome,
the application process begins. A patent application must include a
descriptive specification. 7 The specification must include a written
description of the invention, and the manner and process of making it,
in such "full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
3 U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
4 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1994).
5 Id. § 101.
6 Id. § 103(a).
7 See id. § ll1(a)(2)(A).
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skilled in the art to which it pertains" to make and use the invention.,
In addition, the specification must explain the "best mode contem-
plated by the inventor" of carrying out the invention. 9 The patent is
granted solely based on what is stated in the claims and not the rest of
the patent application.
The term of a utility patent is twenty years from the date of the
filing of the application. 10 Once the patent has been granted, the ap-
plication is made public so that others may determine what is covered
by the patent." During the twenty years of the patent's validity, the
patentee does not necessarily have the right to make, use, or sell the
invention. The inventor does have the right to exclude others from
making, using or selling the patented invention.'
2
The purpose of the Patent Act, as stated by the Court in Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,a3 is to create a "carefully
crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new,
useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return
for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of
years."'1 4 The Supreme Court has identified three specific policies ad-
vanced by the Patent Act:
First, patent law seeks to foster reward and invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation
and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek
to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free
use of the public.'
5
The right to copy is believed by many commentators and courts
to be implicit in the patent laws. The goals of the Act and the constitu-
tional limits placed upon Congress by the Intellectual Property Clause
"led the Supreme Court to articulate a right to copy flowing from the
Patent Act and the Constitution." 16 Given that at the expiration of a
patent the invention enters the public domain, many believe that by
granting trade dress protection to anything included in a patent, the
8 See id. § 112.
9 See id.
10 See id. § 154(a)(2).
11 See id. § 122(b).
12 See id. § 271(d).
13 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
14 See id. at 150-51.
15 Todd R. Geremia, Protecting the Right to Copy: Trade Dress Claims for Configura-
tions in Expired Utility Patents, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 779, 792 (1998) (quoting Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)).
16 See id. at 792.
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patent monopoly would be extended. This would defeat the main pur-
pose of the Patent Act.
B. Trademark Law
Prior to passage of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946,17 trade-
mark law was the exclusive domain of the states. Each state had its
own trademark and unfair competition laws. Unlike patent law, fed-
eral trademark law is not expressly authorized by the Constitution;
instead, Congress used the Commerce Clause to assert control over
this area of law.'
8
There are two purposes behind trademark protection under the
Lanham Act: "1) 'to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of
his business'; and 2) 'to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish
among competing producers."' 19 Protection of consumers is the main
concern of the Lanham Act, but it has never been understood to offer
complete protection against consumer confusion. This goal must often
yield to the interest of promoting free access to the public domain.
C. Trade Dress
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act includes protection of trade
dress. Trade dress protection is intended to advance the same goals as
trademark protection. Originally, the definition of trade dress referred
only to the distinctive characteristics of a product's packaging or label-
ing.20 In 1976, the Eighth Circuit "expanded the definition of trade
dress to include the design features of a product, more commonly
known as the product configuration."'2 1 The definition has since been
further expanded, so that today trade dress is the "'total image' of a
product, including its color, size, shape, and texture, as well as other
characteristics or traits. '2
2
A trade dress claim has two parts: "validity and infringement. '23
"To qualify as a valid, protectable trade dress under § 43(a), a product
configuration must be (1) a distinctive indicator of the product's
source [in other words, have secondary meaning], and (2) nonfunc-
tional. '24 "To prove infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
18 Gwendolyn Gill, Through the Back Door: Attempts to Use Trade Dress to Protect
Expired Patents, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1269 (1999).
19 See Geremia, supra note 15, at 789-90 (quoting Park N' Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park N'Fly
Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
20 See id. at 779.
21 Gill, supra note 18, at 1280.
22 Id. at 1280-81 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992)).
23 Geremia, supra note 15, at 783.
24 Id.
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defendant has imitated the claimed trade dress in such a way as is
likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the product.
25
D. Conflict Between Patent Protection and Trade Dress Protection
1. Constitutional Conflict
Many commentators argue that there is a Constitutional conflict
presented when something previously protected by a utility patent is
subsequently granted trade dress protection. The patent monopoly is
expressly created by the Constitution and provides that Congress may
only grant exclusive rights in discoveries for "limited times. ' 26 There-
fore, Congress may not grant patents of unlimited duration or indi-
rectly extend the patent monopoly by granting "perpetual trademark
protection. ' 27 The Lanham Act is a product of Congress's Commerce
Clause power, not an aspect of the Patent Clause. The Commerce
Clause is powerful, but it does not give Congress the power to over-
ride express limits in other parts of the Constitution. 28 Commentators
who criticize the extent of trade dress protection available to products
previously protected by utility patents argue that, in establishing trade
dress protection under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the Commerce
Clause does not empower Congress to establish what can be viewed as
patent monopolies of unlimited duration.
29
2. Conflict in Application
There are two main concepts that have led to some of the incon-
sistencies among the circuits with regard to trade dress protection and
expired utility patents. Courts seem to have problems determining
how the requirement of secondary meaning applies to the product
configuration of an invention, and there is some uncertainty as to how
to reconcile the functionality doctrine under patent and trademark
laws.
The requirement of secondary meaning in trade dress depends on
whether it is product design or product packaging. In Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,30 the Court stated that trade dress that is inher-
ently distinctive does not require secondary meaning in order to be
25 Id. at 783-4.
26 Brief for Petitioner at 33, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S.
23 (2001) (No. 99-1571).
27 Id.
28 North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 704-05 (1946) (Commerce Clause power
"is limited by express provisions in other parts of the Constitution.")
29 Petitioners' Brief at 36, TrafFix (No. 99-1571).
30 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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protectable under § 43(a). 31 However, the Court later modified that
holding in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc. 32 In Wal-Mart,
the Court stated that inherently distinctive product packaging does
not require secondary meaning, but product design trade dress cannot
be inherently distinctive and therefore does require secondary mean-
ing.33 The Court admitted that this might cause line-drawing
problems, but believed that the frequency and difficulty of deciding
between product design and product packaging would be less frequent
and less difficult than deciding whether a product design was inher-
ently distinctive. 34 It then counseled other courts to err on the side of
caution in close cases and classify ambiguous trade dress as product
design and thereby require secondary meaning.
35
The definition of "functional" is different among the circuits
under trademark law and patent law. Functionality of trade dress is an
unsettled area of the law. In order for an invention to be granted a
patent, it must be useful, or in other words, functional. Trade dress
that is functional may not be protected under the Lanham Act.36 The
Supreme Court defined functional for purposes of the Lanham Act in
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,37 stating that a
design feature is functional "if it is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."'38 However,
in 1995, in Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp. ,39
the Tenth Circuit interpreted functionality more generally:
Finding that functionality in "trade dress parlance" is defined in
terms of "competitive need," the court opined that a product config-
uration could be simultaneously useful, novel, and nonobvious-
hence capable of receiving a utility patent-and nonfunctional-
thus a candidate for trade dress protection. The court reasoned that
"this is the case because to meet patent law's usefulness require-
ment, a product need not be better than other alternatives or essen-
tial to competition." On the other hand, the court commented that
"[tihe availability of equally satisfactory alternatives for a particular
feature, and not its inherent usefulness, is often the fulcrum on
which Lanham Act functionality analysis turns. '40
31 Id. at 774.
32 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
33 See id. at 215.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Gill, supra note 18, at 1291.
37 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
38 Id. at 850 n.10.
39 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
40 Manotti L. Jenkins, A Request to the High Court: Don't Let the Patent Laws be Dis-
tracted by a Flashy Trade Dress, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 323, 331-32
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This is where the patent and trademark laws "collide" and why there




A. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.
41
Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) had an expired patent on a wind-
resistant, mobile traffic-sign stand.42 Shortly after the patent expired,
TrafFix began producing and marketing a sign utilizing MDI's previ-
ously patented technology.4 3 MDI brought suit against TrafFix claim-
ing trade dress infringement, trademark infringement (based on the
similar name TrafFix gave to its sign), and unfair competition, and
TrafFix counterclaimed for antitrust." The district court found for
MDI on the trademark claim and held that MDI was not liable on the
antitrust claim.45 The district court found against MDI on its trade
dress claim.46 The district court found that the element of MDI's trade
dress at issue was the dual-spring design and held that "no reasonable
trier of fact could determine that [it] has established secondary mean-
ing. ' 47 In addition, the court found, independent of the secondary
meaning issue, that the dual-spring design was functional and was
therefore ineligible for trade dress protection regardless of secondary
meaning.48
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of sum-
mary judgment on the trade dress issue. 49 The court of appeals felt
that the district court had erred in deciding that there was no genuine
issue of material fact with regard to the lack of secondary meaning
and that MDI could not prevail at any event due to the functional
product configuration. 50 The court of appeals suggested that the dis-
trict court had committed legal error by considering only the dual-
spring design as the trade dress at issue.51 The court said that if TrafFix
(1997) (analyzing Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498
(10th Cir. 1995)).
41 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
42 Id. at 25.






49 Id. at 27.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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or any other competitor wanted to use the dual-spring design, then it
would have to find another way to set its sign apart from MDI's in
order to avoid infringing MDI's trade dress.52 In determining func-
tionality, it was not sufficient that allowing exclusive use of a feature
"would hinder competition somewhat. '53 The correct test was
whether exclusive use of the feature would "put competitors at a sig-
nificant, non-reputation-related disadvantage.
54
The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve the conflict.55 The
first thing the Supreme Court did was to point out that under 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) the burden of proof of showing that a feature or
design is non-functional is on the party claiming the protection.56 The
Court then pointed out that in Wal-Mart, it had cautioned against mis-
use or over-extension of trade dress and noted that product design
often has a purpose other than source identification (the purpose of
trademark law).57 An additional observation made by the Court was
that copying is not generally discouraged and often has benefits.58
Turning to the facts of this particular case, the Court immediately
stated two rules used to resolve the issue and reverse the decision of
the court of appeals. The Court first restated the rule that "a utility
patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are func-
tional. '59 "If trade dress protection is sought for those features," then
the second rule requires that "one who seeks to establish trade dress
protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is
not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamen-
tal, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device. 60
In analyzing MDI's product under the first rule, the Court first
determined that the central claim advanced in the expired utility pat-
ent was the dual-spring design and that the dual-spring design is the
essential feature in the trade dress at issue.61 It then turned to a previ-
ous case involving infringement of the same patent at issue in this
case. In Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp. ,62 MDI had successfully sued
Winn-Proof for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for a
sign it had manufactured using the dual-spring design. In light of this
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.at 27-8 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
55 530 U.S. 1260 (2000).




60 Id. at 29-30.
61 Id. at 30.
62 697 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1983).
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past ruling, the Court found that the product at issue in this case
would have been covered by the claims of the expired patent.63
Moving on to the second test, the Court opined that the Court of
Appeals had given insufficient weight to the evidentiary significance
of the expired utility patent in establishing functionality. 64 The Court
found that MDI did not meet the burden of proving that its design
feature was nonfunctional. 65
Looking at the test relied on by the court of appeals, the Court
stated that the "significant non-reputation-related disadvantage" test
was an incomplete definition of functionality. First, it is necessary to
determine whether the feature is essential to the use or purpose of the
device or if it affects the cost or quality of the device. 66 If any of these
is the case, then the product is functional. In cases of aesthetic func-
tionality, it is then proper to consider whether there is a competitive
necessity for the feature. 67 Since the dual-spring design is an essential
feature and affects the quality of the device, the feature is functional
and the competitive necessity is not relevant.
The Court then addressed several points that were not specifi-
cally relevant to the TrafFix case, but are relevant to the conflict
among the circuits. The Court reaffirmed the holding in Two Pesos
that non-functional trade dress is permitted for product features that
are inherently distinctive.68 It also stated that, where the feature is
found to be functional, possible alternative designs need not be con-
sidered and neither is it necessary for competitors to explore designs
to hide the spring feature. 69 Finally, the Court addressed how the pre-
sumption of functionality might be overcome where a manufacturer
seeks to protect arbitrary, incidental, or ornamental aspects of a prod-
uct found in the patent claims. The Court suggested that the manufac-
turer might prove that those aspects do not serve a purpose within the
terms of the patent by going beyond the claims and examining the
patent and prosecution history to see if the feature in question is
shown as a useful part of the invention.70 In concluding, the Court
noted that the issue of a Constitutional conflict between the Patent
Clause and trade dress protection had been raised, but declined to
resolve that question on the facts of this case.71
63 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 30.




68 Id. at 33.
69 Id. at 34.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 35.
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B. Pre-Lanham Act Case Law
One of the earliest cases involving a competitor's right to copy
expired patents was Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing
Co.,72 decided in 1896, when Singer, a sewing machine manufacturer,
sued June, one of its competitors. Singer alleged that June was making
and selling sewing machines that had the exact shape and general ap-
pearance [product configuration] as Singer sewing machines. June's
sewing machines included design features not covered by any of
Singer's patents, but which had served to distinguish Singer's products
from those of its competitors.
73
The Court asked whether "the manufacturer, on the cessation of
the monopoly, [has] the right to prevent the making by another of a
like machine in the form in which it was made during the life of the
patent[]. . ..?74 With little discussion, the Court answered its question
in the negative, holding that when the patent monopoly expires, "the
right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes pub-
lic property. '75 Therefore, "on the termination of the patent there
passes to the public the right to make the machine in the form in
which it was constructed during the patent.
76
The Supreme Court again addressed the question of a competi-
tor's right to copy the form of an invention covered by an expired
patent in the 1938 case, Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.77 In this
case, National Biscuit Company made and sold shredded wheat cereal
formed in pillow-shaped biscuits. The product, the process, and the
machinery needed to make the cereal were all under patents owned
by National Biscuit. 78 Upon expiration of the patents, Kellogg began
producing a pillow-shaped biscuits marketed as shredded wheat. Na-
tional Biscuit brought a state unfair competition claim against Kel-
logg, claiming that Kellogg was trying to pass off its product as that of
National Biscuit and that National Biscuit had an exclusive right to
make the cereal in pillow-shaped biscuits. 79 The Court held that Kel-
logg had not violated the state unfair competition statutes when it pro-
duced pillow-shaped biscuits because the machines that produced the
biscuit were no longer under patent, and
72 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
73 See id. at 169.
74 See id. at 184.
75 Id. at 185.
76 lid.
77 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
78 See id. at 117.
79 See id. at 113.
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[w]here an article may be manufactured by all, a particular manu-
facturer can no[t] ... assert exclusive rights in a form in which the
public has become accustomed to see the article and which, in the
minds of the public, is primarily associated with the article rather
than a particular producer. 80
In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co.,81 the Court
made its final pre-Lanham Act statement regarding the right to copy.
Scott Paper brought an action for infringement of an assigned patent
against Marcalus, the assignor.82 Marcalus defended the infringement
on the grounds that the patent was invalid as a copy of prior art, spe-
cifically an expired patent.83 Rather than simply applying the doctrine
of assignor estoppel, the Supreme Court looked to the purpose of pat-
ent law. The Court first addressed the limitations that legislators in-
corporated into patent law. Next, the Court defined the public policy
behind patent law, stating that "[t]he public shall not only be free to
use the information disclosed in an expired patent, but also 'shall re-
ceive the benefits of the unrestricted exploitation, by others, of its dis-
closures.'"84 The Court explicitly stated
that the patentee may not exclude the public from participating in
that good will or secure, to any extent, a continuation of his monop-
oly by resorting to the trademark law and registering as a trademark
any particular descriptive matter appearing in the specifications,
drawings, or claims of the expired patent, whether or not such mat-
ter describes essential elements of the invention or claims. 85
C. Post-Lanham Act Case Law
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co ,86 Stiffel brought an unfair
competition suit against Sears for copying the design of its unpatented
pole lamp. The issue in this case was whether, consistent with federal
patent laws, states could prevent copying of a product that was unpro-
tected by federal statute. The Court concluded that the states could
not protect articles that were covered by expired patents or were not
patentable because, "[j]ust as a State cannot encroach upon the fed-
eral patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that
forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes
80 Id. at 120.
81 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
82 See id. at 251.
83 Id.
84 Glen A. Weitzer, Note, No Trade Dress Protection for Anything Disclosed in a Pat-
ent: A Defense of the Supreme Court's Per Se Restriction, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
181, 185 (2000) (quoting Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 255).
85 Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 256 (quoting Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 117-20).
86 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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with the objectives of the federal patent laws."' 87 Therefore, the Court
held, Sears was free to copy the design of Stiffel's pole lamp provided
the producer of the lamp was made clear.
88
The Court used reasoning similar to Sears in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.89 In this case, Bonito Boats, a boat manu-
facturer, brought suit against Thunder Craft for violation of a Florida
state statute that prohibited the copying of boat hulls using the direct
molding process. The issue was whether this state statute, which
merely prohibited one method of copying, was in conflict with the fed-
eral patent laws. 90 The Court initially described the patent bargain,
which consists of the patent right to exclude in exchange for the dis-
closure of an invention.91 The Court then reaffirmed its holding in
Sears by stating that state regulations may not conflict with the bal-
ance struck by the patent laws and that "free exploitation of ideas will
be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the
exception. '9
2
In Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp.,93 the
Tenth Circuit was faced with an alleged trade dress infringement of a
product design that was an element of the subject of a utility patent.
Vornado, a manufacturer of fans, had been issued a utility patent for
one of its fans.94 The design of a spiral grill face for the fan was part of
the claim.95 Duracraft, a competitor, copied the grill design but did so
in a way that did not literally infringe the existing patent.
96
The Tenth Circuit did not decide whether every patentable con-
figuration or every configuration from an expired patent should be
denied trade dress protection, and it did not treat design and utility
patents differently. Rather, the court explored whether trade dress
protection is available for product configurations of patented inven-
tions.97 The court answered this question by looking to Supreme
Court precedent, legislative history, the functionality doctrine, and by
balancing the competing policies of the Patent Act and the Lanham
87 Id. at 231.
88 See id. at 232.
89 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
90 See id. at 144-45.
91 See id. at 150-51.
92 See id. at 151.
93 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
94 Id. at 1500.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 1501.
97 See id. at 1503.
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Act. 98 In its holding, the Tenth Circuit developed the "significant in-
ventive aspect test":
[W]here a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a util-
ity patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive
aspect of the invention.., so that without it the invention could not
fairly be said to be the same invention, patent law prevents its pro-
tection as trade dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional. 99
Using this test, the court decided that the spiral grill at issue, while it
may not be functional, was part of the product configuration disclosed
in the patent and therefore entered the public domain when the pat-
ent expired. 100
The Seventh Circuit was faced with a case similar to Vornado in
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp. 101 Thomas held a patent on a
two-piece cable tie.'02 Upon expiration of the patent, Panduit, the
leading producer of one-piece cable ties, began producing a two-piece
cable tie similar to the one in Thomas's expired patent. 103 Thomas
filed suit against Panduit, claiming that the oval-shaped head of the
cable tie was protectable trade dress.10 4 After restating the policies
behind the patent and trademark laws, the Seventh Circuit examined
Supreme Court precedent on trade dress protection, including Singer,
Kellogg, Scott Paper, and others. 05 After considering the Tenth Cir-
cuit's holding in Vornado, the court stated that there was no per se
rule against trade dress protection for any feature disclosed in an ex-
pired patent. 106 The court determined that the functionality doctrine
was effective in safeguarding against abuse of trade dress protec-
tion.10 7 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held that, because the oval-
shaped head was not claimed in the patent, the case should be treated
as any other trade dress infringement case. 108
98 See id. at 1504-10.
99 See id. at 1510.
100 See id.
101 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998).
102 See id. at 282.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See id. at 283-6.
106 See id at 288. (declining to follow Vornado because the feature at issue in Vornado
was a claimed feature, whereas in Panduit the oval-shaped head was not specifically
claimed.)
107 See id. at 288.
108 See id. at 290-291.




The key to whether a feature claimed in an expired utility patent
can be granted trade dress protection appears to rest on functionality.
In TrafFix, the Court restates the rule that an expired utility patent is
strong evidence of functionality, creating a heavy burden for the pat-
entee to show that the feature is nonfunctional.'0 9 Because an inven-
tion must be useful to be patented and a product configuration
deemed functional is not valid trade dress, it would seem to follow
that useful configurations previously covered by utility patents would
be ineligible for trade dress protection. In the past, this was consid-
ered to reconcile the Patent Act and the Lanham Act.110
1. TrafFix
Because of the "competitive need" functionality test, many prod-
uct configurations that would have been dedicated to the public do-
main under expired utility patents were able to receive protection as
trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Now, under the TrafFix
decision, it will be more difficult to prove that a product feature is
nonfunctional if it has been claimed in a utility patent. By going all the
way back to Sears and tracing functionality as defined through In-
wood Laboratories and Qualitex, the Court re-established the require-
ment that a feature is functional "if it is essential to the use or purpose
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."'11 Only if
the feature is non-essential or does not meet any of the other above-
mentioned requirements is it necessary to consider whether the fea-
ture, if protected, would cause competitors to have a "significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage," as in cases of aesthetic functionality
(like the green-gold color in Qualitex).112
2. Significant Inventive Aspect
Another test that would restrict trade dress protection for expired
utility patents is the test developed by the Tenth Circuit in Vornado,
referred to as the "significant inventive aspect" test. In its analysis, the
Tenth Circuit first acknowledged the inadequacy of the "competitive
need" functionality test, noting that the right to copy should not de-
109 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29.
110 See Geremia, supra note 15, at 781.
111 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 851 n.10.
112 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.
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pend on the functionality of a configuration changing due to the "va-
garies of the marketplace."'1 13
Based on this observation, the court developed and applied the
"significant inventive aspect" test:
[W]here a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a util-
ity patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive
aspect of the invention.., so that without it the invention could not
fairly be said to be the same invention, patent law prevents its pro-
tection as trade dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional.' 14
This test is considered closer to the original policy underlying patent
law and trademark law and if applied uniformly would allow for less
confusion among the circuits, although some commentators have criti-
cized the test, pointing out that it might invite litigation over defining
the "significant inventive aspect" of the patent.115
B. Alternatives Outside Case Law
There are several alternatives available to courts, in addition to
the rules currently in use, which might provide for more uniformity
among the circuits. In order to prevent forum shopping and avoid ex-
tending the patent monopoly indefinitely, a bright line rule should be
applied.
The easiest rule for courts to apply would be to deny trade dress
protection across the board to any product configuration mentioned in
an expired patent. The court could limit design protection to the do-
main of design patents and once the relevant patent (utility or design)
expired, then the appearance of the product would enter the public
domain with the other aspects of the invention. This alternative might
be unfavorable to many manufacturers who have spent a large sum of
money developing goodwill for their product.
A less strict alternative suggested by one commentator would be
for Congress to amend the Lanham Act to require registration of
trade dress as a prerequisite to protection under the Lanham Act.1 16
Only those designs or product configurations that were disclosed
but not claimed in the patent... would be affected. Registration of
trade dress associated with a utility patent would relieve any person
wanting to copy the invention ... of later [being] found to be in-
fringing a trade dress. On the other side, registration would elimi-
nate the need to prove the existence of a trade dress in an
infringement action. A registry of trade dress associated with utility
113 See Geremia, supra note 15, at 805 (quoting Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510, n.20).
114 Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510.
115 See Geremia, supra note 15, at 807.
116 See Gill, supra note 18, at 1297.
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patents could be established, which would then act as prior notice to
any would be copier.
117
Another alternative that has been proposed is to limit the right of
competitors to copy the invention to the scope of the patentee's right
to exclude. 118 In Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp.," 9 the court ex-
plained that "competitors have the absolute right to copy only those
product configurations that are protectable during the life of the pat-
ent." 1 20 "But those configurations disclosed only in dependent claims
or those that are otherwise disclosed but not protectable during the
life of the patent, are eligible for trade dress protection if they are
nonfunctional." 
1 2 1
The Zip Dee rule would resolve inconsistency among the circuits
almost as certainly as forbidding trade dress protection to all configu-
rations mentioned in a patent. It presents a clear rule for the courts to
follow, but it can be argued that it does not serve the patent policy of
allowing the whole patent to be dedicated to the public domain.
A final alternative presented by many commentators is to
continue to resolve the controversy on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
Trade dress protection for product configurations disclosed in
utility patents is a very unsettled area of the law. Before the passage
of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court had some amount of consis-
tency, but as the functionality doctrine evolved along with the inter-
pretations of the Lanham Act, the consistency was lost. Hopefully, the
Supreme Court's recent decision in TrafFix will clear up some of the
inconsistency among the circuits. However, in cases where it is not as
clear that the product for which trade dress protection is being sought
was precisely what was claimed in the patent, courts may still be
forced to struggle with the apparent conflict between trade dress law
and patent law.
117 See id. at 1297.
118 See Geremia, supra note 15, at 812 (discussing Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931
F.Supp. 602 (N.D. Ii. 1996)).
119 931 F.Supp. 602 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
120 See id. at 611-12.
121 See id.
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